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Do Federal Reserve Presidents Communicate with a Regional Bias? 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of U.S. monetary policy stance as expressed in 
speeches by Federal Reserve (Fed) officials over the period January 1998 to September 2009. 
Econometrically, we use a probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables 
to  explain  the  content  of  these  speeches.  Our  results  are,  first,  that  Fed  governors  and 
presidents  follow a Taylor rule  when expressing their opinions: a rise  in  inflation or the 
Leading Index makes a hawkish speech more likely. Second, when Fed presidents make a 
speech  in  their  home  district,  its  content  is  influenced  by  both  regional  and  national 
macroeconomic variables, whereas speeches given outside the home district are influenced 
solely by national information. Third, the influence of regional variables increases during (i) 
Ben Bernanke’s tenure as Fed Chairman, (ii) recessions, and (iii) the financial crisis. Finally, 
speeches by nonvoting presidents reflect regional economic development to a greater extent 
than those by voting presidents. 
 
JEL:    D72, E52, E58 
Keywords:  Central  Bank  Communication,  Disagreement,  Federal  Reserve,  Monetary 
Policy, Regional Representation, Speeches 
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1. Introduction 
U.S. monetary policy is set by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists 
of 19 members. Seven of these are the members of the Board of Governors (BOG) and have 
voting rights at every FOMC meeting. The other 12 are the presidents of the regional Federal 
Reserve (Fed) Banks and share the remaining five votes: the president of the New York Fed 
votes on a continuous base; the other presidents rotate the remaining four voting seats on an 
annual basis.
1 
By law, all members of the FOMC are committed to the Fed’s main goals: maximum 
employment and stable prices. However, in practice, it is questionable whether presidents 
focus  solely  on  national  interests.  For  instance,  Meade  and  Sheets  (2005)  show  that 
policymakers  take  regional  unemployment  into  consideration  when  voting  on  monetary 
policy. An FOMC member representing a district in which unemployment is 1 percentage 
point  above  the  national  average  will  oppose  tighter  policy  2.4  percentage  points  less 
frequently than an FOMC member from a district in which unemployment is at the national 
average.  Gildea  (1992)  provides  evidence  that  presidents  are  more  concerned  about 
developments in the regions they represent than with the nation as a whole. He finds an 
increase  in  the  probability  of  voting  in  favor  of  more  expansionary  monetary  policy  if 
regional unemployment is high relative to the national rate.
2 
However, Gerlach-Kristen and Meade (2010) show that dissents occurred infrequently 
during Alan Greenspan’s tenure as chairman: members cast dissenting votes only when they 
strongly disagreed with a proposed directive and cast assenting votes when they disagreed 
only weakly. In the latter case, the five voting presidents (and, obviously, the seven nonvoting 
presidents) must rely on other channels if they want to express their opposition to the interest 
rate proposal.
3 
The first of these channels is voiced disagreement in internal Committee discussions: 
Meade (2005) illustrates that the rate of disagreement in Committee discussions (a transcript 
of these is publicly available)  about interest rate setting  was about  30 percent.  In a  more 
recent paper, Meade (2010) shows that bank presidents (voters and nonvoters) are more likely 
to voice disagreement with a given policy proposal than  are governors. One potential source 
                                                 
1 The presidents of (i) Boston, Philadelphia, and Richmond, (ii) Cleveland and Chicago, (iii) Atlanta, St. Louis, 
and Dallas, (iv) Minneapolis, Kansas City, and San Francisco, respectively, alternate the voting seats. 
2 Another branch of the literature focuses on policymakers’ inflation aversion. For instance, Belden (1989) finds 
that presidents are more likely to favor tighter monetary policy than are governors. Furthermore, they dissent 
more often in the direction of tighter monetary policy, whereas governors’ dissent is more balanced. Havrilesky 
and Gildea (1995) confirm that presidents prefer less expansionary monetary policy than do governors. 
3 During our sample period (January 1998 –October 2009), 74 decisions were taken unanimously; in only 26 
cases did one or two of the 12 FOMC members vote against the rate proposal. 4 
of  this  disagreement  is  concern  over  regional  economic  development,  which  does  not 
necessarily coincide with the overall national situation. Presidents should react sensitively to 
regional developments, as they (i) mainly live in the district they represent, (ii) talk frequently 
with local businesspeople about their needs and problems, (iii) rely on expert input from 
members of a local staff, and (iv) are selected by the district board of directors, members of 
which represent banking, industrial, or other interests in their region. However, the Board of 
Governors has veto power over nominations made by regional banks’ boards,
4 which might 
limit the scope of regional bias. Nevertheless, Chappell et al. (2008) empirically confirm that 
regional conditions affect  the  policy preferences of  Fed  presidents.  There is some weak 
evidence that regional developments also influence governors. However, when considering all 
FOMC members, the authors find that national conditions matter more than regional ones.
5 
The second channel for expressing opposition to a specific FOMC position is strategic 
forecasting: Based on a dataset of individual forecasts, Tillmann (2011) shows that nonvoters 
systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast when they favor tighter 
policy, and underpredict inflation when they favor looser policy. This strategic forecasting is 
used to influence policy deliberation within the FOMC.
6  Banternghansa and McCracken 
(2009) discover that  the most significant forecast disagreements  are between the regional 
presidents and the vice chairman, even though the vice chairman tends to be one of the most 
consensus-oriented members of the FOMC. Yet, there is no evidence that strategic forecasting 
is due to regionally-driven motives. 
A  third  channel  for  voicing  dissatisfaction  with  Fed  monetary  policy  is  via 
communication. Over the past two decades, the Fed (and other central banks) has increasingly 
relied on informal communication with the public. Speeches by Fed officials are an additional 
means of airing the bank ’s view on economic outlook and the future course of monetary 
policy. Fed speeches significantly affect financial market expectations (see, e.g., Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2007; Hayo et al., 2008) and also help explain and predict target rate decisions 
(Hayo  and  Neuenkirch,  2010).  Therefore,  it  is  of  particular  interest  to  analyze  the 
determinants underlying these speeches. 
                                                 
4 For instance, under Paul Volcker’s tenure as Fed Chairman, regional board of director nominations in Atlanta 
and St. Louis were vetoed. 
5 There is also similar empirical evidence for countries other than the United States. Berger and de Haan (2002) 
show  that  economic  differences  across  the  German  Länder  affect ed  the  voting  behavior  of   regional 
representatives on the Bundesbank Governing Council in the period 1948–1961. Heinemann and Huefner (2004) 
report that country-specific economic considerations affected ECB policy outcomes during the early years of the 
euro. 
6  However, Tillmann (2 011) does not claim that  strategic  forecasting by nonvoting presidents  has been 
successful in influencing actual Fed decisions. 5 
Presidents have two incentives to use speeches to express their disagreement with the 
current or expected policy rate. First, speeches are nonbinding; even voting presidents can 
“oppose” an FOMC position publicly but still vote in line with the Fed’s proposal (in case of 
minor disagreement) for reasons described below. Second, central bankers can express their 
views on an ad hoc basis at any time (except during the blackout period seven days before and 
three days after FOMC meetings). 
We expect presidents to express more concern over regional economic development 
and the future course of monetary policy in their speeches than is reflected in their actual 
voting  behavior,  for  two  reasons.
7  First,  the  vast  majority  of  presidents’  speeches  are 
delivered in their home districts, where the audience is mostly regionally oriented. Second, 
speeches by presidents receive far less national media attention than do speeches by governors 
(Neuenkirch,  2009)  or  interest  rate  decisions  and  accompanying  discussion.  Thus, 
emphasizing  a  regional  point  of  view  likely  generates  support  by  regionally-oriented 
audiences and does not receive much attention (if any) from the national media. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper analyzing the determinants of Fed 
presidents’ speeches and testing the hypotheses put forward above. Econometrically, we use a 
probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables to explain the content of 
these speeches. We focus on four research questions. First, do Fed presidents use national 
and/or regional economic information when expressing a tightening (easing) inclination in 
their speeches? Second, do presidents  adjust the contents  of their speeches  depending on 
whether they are speaking inside or outside their home district or under different chairmen 
(Greenspan vs. Bernanke)? Third, do presidents’ speeches react to different phases of the 
business cycle (contractions vs. expansions) or the recent financial crisis? Fourth, are there 
significant  differences  in  the  content  of  speeches  made  by  voting  presidents,  nonvoting 
presidents, and BOG members? Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we utilize a 
newly constructed dataset that covers all speeches by Fed officials over the period January 
1998 to September 2009. Second, we believe this is the first study to investigate determinants 
of central bank speeches, a belief supported by a comprehensive literature survey conducted 
by Blinder et al. (2008). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
coding of central bank communication and explain the econometric methodology. Section 3 
                                                 
7 An example of disagreement manifested in communication can be observed during the Fed’s tightening cycle 
between June 2004 and June 2006. At each meeting the interest rate was increased by 25 bps. During that period, 
the vast majority of speeches hinted at interest rate hikes in line with the chosen policy direction. At the same 
time, Cathy Minehan, President of the Boston Fed, emphasized the below national average economic conditions 
in her district during several speeches. 6 
presents  the  empirical  results  for  all  presidents.  Section  4  studies  whether  the  factors 
determining the thrust of the speech are affected by (i) the location of the speech, (ii) the 
current chairman, (iii) the phase of the business cycle, and (iv) the recent financial crisis. In 
Section  5  we  differentiate  between  the  determinants  of  speeches  by  voting  presidents, 
nonvoting presidents, and governors. Section 6 concludes with some policy implications. 
 
2. Data and Econometric Methodology 
Federal Reserve Speeches 
We  use  the  dataset  introduced  by  Hayo  et  al.  (2008),  which  includes  subjectively  coded 
indicator  variables  for  all  speeches  by  Fed  officials.  The  speeches  are  sorted  into  two 
categories based on whether they indicate likely increases or decreases in the Federal Funds 
target  rate.
8  Speeches  referring  directly  to  monetary  policy  are  easily  interpreted.  For 
example, when the Fed states that “the Federal Funds rate must rise at some point to prevent 
pressures on price inflation from eventually emerging” (Greenspan, 2004), a target rate hike 
is imminent. However, other statements are not so straightforward. For example, speeches 
stressing potentially inflationary pressures can be seen as indirect signs of a future rate hike. 
Speeches  presenting  a  bright  economic  outlook  (in  terms  of  GDP  growth  or  positive 
employment news) can also be read as an indication of rising interest rates because in good 
economic times the Fed needs to take steps to prevent the economy from overheating. Hayo 
and Neuenkirch (2010) point out that the Fed typically does not talk extensively about rate 
cuts;  thus,  a  speech  conveying  a  negative  economic  outlook  is  a  particularly  informative 
signal. In total, there are 612 speeches coded as either tightening or easing indications: 194 by 
voting presidents, 267 by nonvoting presidents, and 151 by BOG members.
9 
The  following  simple  framework  motivates  our  empirical  approach  (Meade  and 
Sheets, 2005). Central bankers choose their wording according to nation-wide economic and 
regional economic conditions:
10 
                                                 
8 In our analysis, we focus on speeches indicating the future direction of interest rates. Speeches that take a 
“neutral” view of the economic outlook and the future course of monetary policy are excluded from the analysis, 
as are speeches with no particular information on either topic. Even during a tightening period (e.g., Q2/2004–
Q2/2006) or easing period (e.g., Q1/2001–Q4/2001 or Q3/2007–Q4/2008) presidents often refrain (or are forced 
to refrain during the blackout period around policy meetings) from making comments about the economy and/or 
the future stance of monetary policy. Including these additional speeches and employing, for example, ordered 
probit estimations would introduce additional noise into the data, as these speeches should not be treated as 
actually neutral, and lead to both biased estimators and increased standard errors. We thus focus on speeches 
indicating a clear tightening or easing tendency. 
9 Table A1 in the Appendix shows the frequency of these events. Note that other forms of communication are not 
included: post-meeting statements and monetary policy reports express the view of the whole committee  rather 
than an individual opinion, as do congressional hearings, which, in addition, are not scheduled autonomously. 
10 Many macroeconomic variables are not forecastable beyond a random walk (see, e.g., Stock and Watson, 2007 
for U.S. inflation forecasts). As a consequence, we employ realized macroeconomic announcements rather than 7 
                          , 
where           denotes a speech by a central banker representing district   at time period  . 
    represents  national  economic  conditions  available  at  the  time  of  the  speech  and       
represents the macroeconomic conditions in that president’s district. A linear representation of 
this function illustrates two sources of potential disagreement: 
                                    . 
First,  regional  economic  conditions       vary  across  the  12  Fed  districts.  Second, 
responsiveness  to  regional  and  national  economic  conditions  could  vary  across  central 
bankers,  that  is,                            ,  with  j  and  k  indicating  different  persons.
11 
However,  we can show  for our sample  that  individual  central bankers’  preferences  are 
(nearly)  uncorrelated  with  regional  or  national  economic  conditions.
12  Thus, we interpret 
coefficients           as weights of national and regional information, respectively. 
 
Macroeconomic Data 
In our empirical specification, we examine whether central bankers follow a modified Taylor 
rule when phrasing their speeches. Thus, nation-wide inflation,
13 as well as nation-wide and 
regional real indicators, should contribute to this “reaction function.” The real-time consumer 
price  index  (CPI)  inflation  rate  is  employed  as  a  price  indicator.  As  an  indicator  of  real 
economic  activity  we  utilize  the  Philadelphia  Fed’s  six-month-ahead  Leading  Index.  The 
Leading  Index  is  provided  at  the  national  and  state  levels  and  is  based  on  employment, 
                                                                                                                                                         
forecasts.  However,  robustness  tests  employing  expected  consumer  price  index  inflation  and  expected 
unemployment confirm our results using realized indicators. Results are available on request. 
11 Individual macroeconomic assessments by FOMC members are released with a time lag of  10 years (Romer, 
2010). Thus, we are not able to assign each member her/his own set of macroeconomic variables and  must 
assume that the central bankers employ the same information set. 
12 Our results are robust to the inclusion of individual-specific effects in the estimation of          . As part of a 
robustness test, we add to Equation (3) person-specific dummy variables for all central bankers in our sample 
who made 20 or more speeches. Only in case of Janet Yellen (President of the San Francisco Fed during the 
period June 2004–October 2010) do we find a significant person-specific effect. The negative coefficient is in 
line with her reputation for being “dovish.” Results are available on request. 
In the literature, direct measures of preference are put forward, but they have at least one major drawback. For 
example, the well-known index by Meade (2005) is constructed on the basis of past voting behavior and voiced 
disagreement  within  the  FOMC,  which  in turn is determined by  a combination of  the individual degree of 
inflation aversion and national and regional economic conditions. Thus, using such indicators in the empirical 
analysis makes it impossible to identify these conceptionally different effects. 
13 Data source: St. Louis Fed. Unfortunately, there is only national CPI data, no state - or district-wide CPI data. 
The Fed’s Beige Book cannot be used as a source of information of regional prices because (i) it does not 
regularly contain an assessment of price developments in the districts and (ii) even if it does, the assessment is 
typically only qualitative. 8 
housing, production, and financial data. GDP weights of the respective states and counties are 




Econometrically, we use a pooled setup  of these  speeches over all  Fed districts. A pooled 
setup is helpful for obtaining a larger number of observations, as 12 of the 22 bank presidents 
in our sample made fewer than 20 speeches. Furthermore, any remaining potential biases due 
to region- or president-specific effects are reduced in a pooled setup.
15 We use a probit model 
to take into account the discrete nature of the speeches. Central bankers  discuss either an 
easing inclination (coded 0) or a tightening inclination ( coded 1). Our specification is  as 
follows: 
             
                                                , 
where          
   is the latent continuous variable representing the binary choice. Our “Taylor 
rule” includes  three explanatory variables:  national  inflation, national  Leading  Index, and 
regional  Leading  Index.
16  The  residuals  t  are  assumed  to  follow  a  standard  normal 
distribution, which implies that the probabilities of the different outcomes can be written as: 
                                   and                                       , 
where   denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution,      is a vector of explanatory 
variables,  and     a  vector  of  coefficients.  The  probit  models  are  estimated  by  maximum 
likelihood. 
 
3. Determinants of Presidents’ Speeches 
In  this  section,  we  present  the  results  of  our  empirical  estimations  employing  different 
variations of Equation (3). Column (1) of Table 1 shows the model based on inflation and the 
national Leading Index, Column (2) uses regional data for the Leading Index and inflation, 
and the specification in Column (3) incorporates all three variables. 
 
                                                 
14 As national financial data are part of both the national and the regional indexes, we subtract the national index 
from  the  regional  index  to  create  a  purely  regional  series: 
                 
                                       . 
15 We assume that presidents’ preferences are distributed over a hawkish-dovish continuum. We cannot precisely 
observe the degree of a president’s hawkishness independently from the regional economic conditions (see also 
note 12). Thus, by using a pooled setup, rather than individual regressions, we reduce the potential bias in the 
estimated coefficients, as the influence of hawkish or dovish preferences is, at least partly, averaged out over all 
presidents. 
16 Table A2 in the Appendix sets out descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. 9 
Table 1: Explaining Presidents’ Speeches with Inflation and Leading Index 
   (1) All Speeches     (2) All Speeches     (3) All Speeches 
Coefficients                         
Inflation Rate  0.099  **    0.201  **    0.134  ** 
Leading Index  0.415  **    –––      0.405  ** 
Regional Leading Index  –––        0.503  **     0.453  ** 
Marginal Effects                         
Inflation Rate  0.029  **    0.068  **    0.038  ** 
Leading Index  0.122  **    –––      0.115  ** 
Regional Leading Index  –––        0.171  **     0.128  ** 
Observations  461        461        461    
LR Statistic  143.3  **    82.6  **    147.5  ** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –242.1      –275.4      –231.8   
Pseudo-R
2  0.134      0.015      0.171   
Correct Predictions  73.8%        66.2%        75.9%    
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber (1967)/White (1980) 
robust standard errors are used. 
 
The inflation rate has a positive effect on the likelihood of indicating an interest rate 
hike  in  a  speech,  but  its  quantitative  impact  varies  across  different  specifications.  The 
probability of giving a hawkish speech increases by 2.9 percentage points (pp) when inflation 
rises by 1 pp in the model employing the national Leading Index (Model (1)), whereas it rises 
by 6.8 pp in the model using the regional Leading Index (Model (2)). This difference could be 
explained by the fact that the national Leading Index contains financial information in the 
form  of  the  spread  between  10-year  and  three-month  bond  yields.  Such  a  term  spread 
indicator  is  often  used  as  a  proxy  for  inflation  (and  monetary  policy)  expectations  and 
therefore partly crowds out the impact of the inflation rate itself.  In the case of a higher 
Leading Index we find a significantly positive effect as well, which we interpret as the Fed 
preparing the ground for an interest rate hike, with the aim of preventing the economy from 
overheating. A one unit increase in the national Leading Index increases the likelihood of a 
hawkish speech by 12.2 pp (see Model (1)), whereas an increase in the regional Leading 
Index results in a larger response of 17.1 pp (see Model (2)). Thus, the results suggest that 
regional Fed presidents follow a modified “Taylor rule” when phrasing their speeches: a rise 
in inflation or the Leading Index makes a hawkish speech more likely. Model fit in terms of 
pseudo-R
2 and correct predictions is better for Model (1) employing the national Leading 
Index (0.13 and 74%) than for Model (2) using the regional Leading Index (0.02 and 66%). 
The  results  of  estimating  a  joint  model  containing  national  and  regional  Leading 
Indexes (see Model (3)) reveal that both Leading Indexes remain significant and the model 10 
has the best fit among all three specifications (pseudo-R
2: 0.17; correct predictions: 76%). The 
marginal  effect  of  a  rise  in  inflation  is  now  3.8  pp.  The  marginal  effect  of  the  regional 
Leading  Index  is  slightly  larger  than  that  of  the  national  one  (12.8  pp  vs.  11.5  pp),  but 
statistically this difference is equal to zero. This result stands in contrast to Chappell et al. 
(2008),  who  find  that  national  developments  clearly  outweigh  regional  conditions  in  the 
context  of  interest  rate  discussions.  However,  presidents’  speeches  are  the  least  “costly” 
channel of expressing concern and are targeted primarily  at local audiences, which could 
explain the predominance of regional information in this context. 
 
4. Determinants of Presidents’ Speeches in Different Subsamples 
In this section, we analyze if the factors determining the thrust of the speeches are affected by 
whether they are delivered (i) inside or outside the home district, (ii) under different chairmen 
(Greenspan vs. Bernanke), (iii) during different phases of the business cycle (contractions vs. 
expansions), and (iv) before or during the recent financial crisis. First, we expect presidents to 
be even more focused on regional information when the audience is from their home district. 
Second, based on narrative evidence that Chairman Bernanke tolerates more public discussion 
than former Chairman Greenspan, we investigate whether this difference between the two 
chairmen is reflected in the emphasis presidents give to the regional economy compared to the 
national  economy.  Finally,  during  contractions  and  the  financial  crisis,  we  anticipate  that 
presidents  will  increasingly  express  concern  about  economic  developments  in  their  home 
districts, with the aim of reassuring the residents of those districts that their concerns are 
understood and being taken into account. 
Table 2 presents the results for speeches delivered inside and outside the presidents’ 
home districts. The fit of Model (4), referring to home district speeches, is much better in 
terms of pseudo-R
2 (0.20 vs. 0.06) and slightly better in terms of correct predictions (77% vs. 
75%) than Model (5), which considers speeches made outside the home district. Reflecting 
the results for all speeches (Model (3) in Table 1), speeches delivered inside the home district 
are based on both Leading Indexes and inflation information. A 1 pp rise in inflation increases 
the likelihood of a hawkish speech by 3.4 pp, whereas a 1 pp increase in the national and the 
regional Leading Indexes significantly lower the probability of such a speech, by 12.2 pp and 
12.9 pp, respectively. In contrast, hawkish speeches outside the home district are 5.7 pp more 
likely when inflation increases by 1 pp. A 1 pp hike in the national Leading Index drives up 
the likelihood of a speech mentioning tighter monetary policy by 7.6 pp; the regional Leading 
Index plays no role outside the home district. 11 
 
Table 2: Explaining Speeches in Different Locations  
   (4) Inside Home District     (5) Outside Home District 
Coefficients                
Inflation Rate  0.122  **    0.188  ** 
Leading Index  0.442  **    0.250  * 
Regional Leading Index  0.467  **     0.327   
Marginal Effects                
Inflation Rate  0.034  **    0.057  ** 
Leading Index  0.122  **    0.076  ** 
Regional Leading Index  0.129  **     0.099   
Observations  390        71    
LR Statistic  124.6  **    21.9  ** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –192.2      –37.8   
Pseudo-R
2  0.196      0.059   
Correct Predictions  76.9%        74.7%    
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber (1967)/White (1980) 
robust standard errors are used. 
 
Table 3 differentiates the determinants of the contents of speeches in our sample by 
whether they are delivered during Alan Greenspan’s tenure as Fed chairman (until January 
2006) or during Ben Bernanke’s tenure (since February 2006). The explanatory power of the 
model is better for the Bernanke subsample (pseudo-R
2: 0.25; correct predictions: 80%) than 
for  the  Greenspan  subsample  (pseudo-R
2:  0.18;  correct  predictions:  79%).  The  impact  of 
inflation on the tone of a speech does not depend on who is chairman. A 1 pp increase in 
inflation increases the likelihood of a hawkish speech by 4 pp. However, we find statistically 
significant differences in the determinants of speeches when it comes to the Leading Indexes. 
During Greenspan’s tenure as chairman (Model (6)), a 1 pp hike in the national Leading Index 
significantly affects the probability of delivering a hawkish speech by 11.9 pp, whereas the 
regional Leading Index is insignificant. In contrast, we find both indexes to influence the tone 
of speeches by Fed presidents during the Bernanke subsample (Model (7)). A 1 pp rise in the 
regional Leading Index increases the likelihood of a hawkish speech by 27.6 pp; the same 
increase in the national Leading Index results in a 9.1 pp increase in the likelihood of this type 
of speech. This difference is large and statistically significant (Chi
2(1) = 10.6**). Finally, the 
greater  importance  of  regional  concerns  during  the  Bernanke  chairmanship  is  further 
illustrated by the finding that the regional Leading Index coefficient is significantly higher in 
the second subsample (z = 3.6**). 
 
Table 3: Explaining Speeches Under Greenspan and Bernanke 12 
   (6) Greenspan     (7) Bernanke 
Coefficients                
Inflation Rate  0.151  **    0.139  ** 
Leading Index  0.445  **    0.323  ** 
Regional Leading Index  0.158        0.980  ** 
Marginal Effects                
Inflation Rate  0.040  **    0.039  ** 
Leading Index  0.119  **    0.091  ** 
Regional Leading Index  0.042        0.276  ** 
Observations  286        175    
LR Statistic  103.5  **    55.5  ** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –139.6      –82.6   
Pseudo-R
2  0.176      0.247   
Correct Predictions  78.7%        80.0%    
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber (1967)/White (1980) 
robust standard errors are used. 
 
Table  4  displays  estimates  for  speeches  given  during  expansions  of  the  economy 
(Model (8): January 1998–February 2001, November 2001–November 2007, and June 2009–
September  2009)  as  well  as  contractions  (Model  (9):  March  2001–October  2001  and 
December  2007–May  2009)  as  measured  by  the  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research. 
Model fit does not vary in terms of correct predictions (79%), but the pseudo-R
2 is higher for 
the contractionary periods (0.26 vs. 0.17). The influence of a 1 pp increase in the inflation rate 
raises the likelihood of a hawkish speech by 3.9 pp during expansions and by 4.5 pp during 
contractions.  This  is  economically  very  similar  and  statistically  we  cannot  reject  the 
hypothesis that the response is the same across the two phases of the business cycle. Thus, our 
estimates  suggest  that  independently  of  the  business  cycle  phase,  price  developments  are 
analyzed  carefully  and  affect  the  monetary  policy  inclination  expressed  in  presidents’ 
speeches. However, the reverse is found when considering the two Leading Indexes, as the 
size of their influence is dependent on business cycle phase. During contractions, presidents 
put much more emphasis on regional information than on national data. A 1 pp increase in the 
regional Leading Index increases the probability of a hawkish speech by 28.6 pp, whereas the 
effect is only 6.2 pp in the case of such an increase in the national index. This difference is not 
only economically but also statistically significant (Chi
2(1) = 10.9**). During expansions, in 
contrast, a marginal increase in the national Leading Index raises the likelihood of a hawkish 
speech by 12.1 pp, whereas as a comparable increase in the regional index yields an increase 
in such probability of only 6.9 pp. The difference across subsamples is statistically significant 
for both the national Leading Index (z = 2.3*) and the regional Leading Index (z = 3.0**). 13 
 
Table 4: Explaining Speeches Over the Business Cycle 
   (8) Expansions     (9) Contractions 
Coefficients                
Inflation Rate  0.144  **    0.149  ** 
Leading Index  0.453  **    0.206  * 
Regional Leading Index  0.256  *     0.946  ** 
Marginal Effects                
Inflation Rate  0.039  **    0.045  ** 
Leading Index  0.121  **    0.062  * 
Regional Leading Index  0.069  *     0.286  ** 
Observations  339        122    
LR Statistic  121.0  **    42.8  ** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –164.3      –59.7   
Pseudo-R
2  0.167      0.257   
Correct Predictions  78.8%        78.7%    
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber (1967)/White (1980) 
robust standard errors are used. 
 
Table 5 shows the outcome for speeches given before (January 1998–June 2007) and 
during the financial crisis (August 2007–September 2009).
17 Model (10) for the pre-financial 
crisis subsample is superior to Model (11) for the financial crisis subsample (pseudo-R
2: 0.19 
vs.  0.07;  correct  predictions:  85%  vs.  67%).  Before  the  financial  crisis,  speeches  are 
influenced by all three variables: a 1 pp increase in the inflation rate makes a hawkish speech 
more likely by 1.8 pp, whereas a corresponding change in the national (regional) Leading 
Index increases the likelihood by 15.7 (10.5) pp. During the financial crisis, the regional 
Leading Index increases the probability of a hawkish speech by 17.4 pp, whereas the effect of 
the  national  Leading  Index  is  insignificant.
18  The marginal effect for inflation  becomes 
negative during the financial crisis.  Despite the fact that inflation (and its forecasts)  did not 
decline during that period, except in the aftermath of the Lehman crash, presidents put much 
more emphasis on real economic and financial conditions.  Arguably, this reflects the fear of 
monetary policymakers that the crisis might turn into a persistent deflation.  Finally,  the 
differences across subsamples are not only economically relevant when considering the point 
estimates, but also statistically significant (inflation rate: z = 3.0**; national Leading Index: z 
= 6.7**). 
 
                                                 
17  Restricting  the  financial  crisis  subsample  to  the  period  after  the  Lehman  crash  leaves  us  with  too  few 
observations. 
18 The difference between the regional and the national Leading Index is statistically significant  (Chi
2(1) = 
7.3**). 14 
Table 5: Explaining Speeches Made  Before and During the Financial Crisis 
   (10) Pre-Financial Crisis     (11) Financial Crisis 
Coefficients                
Inflation Rate  0.084  *    –0.113  * 
Leading Index  0.748  **    –0.045   
Regional Leading Index  0.502  **     0.501  ** 
Marginal Effects                
Inflation Rate  0.018  *    –0.039  * 
Leading Index  0.157  **    –0.016   
Regional Leading Index  0.105  **     0.174  ** 
Observations  342        119    
LR Statistic  137.0  **    18.9  ** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –128.2      –72.1   
Pseudo-R
2  0.185      0.067   
Correct Predictions  85.1%        67.2%    
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber (1967)/White (1980) 
robust standard errors are used. 
 
To summarize, in line with our expectations, presidents put relatively more weight on 
regional information when speaking in their home districts. Under Alan Greenspan’s tenure as 
chairman,  the  content  of  presidents’  speeches  is  based  on  national  macroeconomic  data, 
whereas  under  Ben  Bernanke,  regional  economic  information  dominates.  Furthermore, 
presidents express their concern about economic developments in their home districts much 
more strongly during recessions and during the financial crisis. Inflation plays a subordinate 
role in presidents’ speeches during the crisis period. 
 
5. Analyzing Different Groups in the FOMC 
In this section, we study speeches by different groups in the FOMC. Not all presidents have 
voting rights at all times and nonvoting presidents need to rely on other instruments to express 
their  views  and  exert  (regionally  motivated)  influence  on  policy  discussion.  Nonvoting 
presidents can also more easily at least appear to act in their own region’s interest as they 
never have to take public action in support of these interests. Therefore, we expect nonvoting 
presidents to be even more concerned with regional developments in their speeches than are 
voting  presidents.  To  test  for  these  potential  differences,  we  split  the  presidents  into 
“voting”
19 and “nonvoting” groups and also compare these two subgroups to the group of 
governors. 
                                                 
19 The New York Fed  President has voting rights all the time.  We can show that omitting this president’s 
speeches from the voting group does not change the results. Results are available on request. 15 
Rather  than  setting  interest  rates  based  on  current  information  only,  typically  the 
FOMC decides on a path for the Federal Funds target rate, which implies a significant degree 
of persistence when estimating Taylor rules (Clarida et al., 1998). To test to what extent the 
current interest rate path is represented in speeches by different groups of FOMC members, 
we add to Equation (3) an indicator, “Monet. Policy Direction,” to capture the current interest 
rate direction. This indicator is given the value –1 if the last interest rate change was a cut and 
the value of 1 in the event of a hike. Thus, including “Monet. Policy Direction” implies that 
the other explanatory variables capture deviations from the current interest rate trend. Column 
(12) of Table 5 examines all presidents, Column (13) voters, Column (14) nonvoters, and 
Column (15) governors. 
 
Table 6: Explaining Speeches with Inflation, Leading Index, and an Interest Rate Trend 
   (12) 
Presidents     (13) 
Voters     (14) 
Nonvoters     (15) 
Governors 
Coefficients                                  
Inflation Rate  0.172  **    0.142  **    0.200  **    –0.007   
Leading Index  0.332  **    0.436  **    0.261  **    0.463  ** 
Regional Leading Index  0.414  **    0.278      0.523  **    –––   
Monet. Policy Direction  0.248  **     0.116        0.340  **     –0.134    
Marginal Effects                       
Inflation Rate  0.048  **    0.038  **    0.056  **    –0.002   
Leading Index  0.093  **    0.117  **    0.073  **    0.147  ** 
Regional Leading Index  0.115  **    0.075      0.147  **       
Monet. Policy Direction  0.069  **     0.031        0.095  **     –0.043   
Observations  461        194        267        151    
LR Statistic  135.2  **    62.8  **    71.0  **    32.5  ** 
Pseudo Log-Likelihood  –227.3      –91.9      –132.9      –84.3   
Pseudo-R
2  0.187      0.199      0.193      0.056   
Correct Predictions  75.9%        77.8%        76.8%        72.9%    
Note: * and ** indicate significance at a 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Huber (1967)/White (1980) 
robust standard errors are used. 
 
The fit of Models (12)–(14) is much better than that of the governor model (Model 
(15)) in terms of pseudo-R
2 (0.19 vs. 0.06) and slightly better in terms of correct predictions 
(77% vs. 73%). However, the latter model includes no regional Leading Index.
20 In general, 
                                                 
20 In some of the literature, governors are assigned particular regional affiliations (e.g., Meade and Sheets, 2005; 
Chappell et al., 2008). However, there are some obvious problems with this approach. (1) The Fed sometimes 
defines formal district affiliations to meet the legal requirement of regional diversity and these affiliations do not 
necessarily coincide with the governor’s true origin (some examples of this are provided by Chappell et al., 
2008). (2) The governors live and work in the capital and do not have regular contact with businesspeople from 
their “home” districts. (3) The governors rely on input from the nationally-oriented Board staff. 16 
presidents speak in line with the current monetary policy trend: a one unit increase in this 
variable increases the probability of a hawkish speech by 6.9 pp. When compared to Model 
(3) of Table 1, the inclusion of the trend variable in Model (12) has only a small effect on the 
other coefficients: its inclusion increases the influence of inflation to 4.8 pp but reduces the 
impact of the national and the regional Leading Index, which are now 9.3 pp and 11.5 pp, 
respectively. 
Given that the same variables are significant, it appears that the results for Model (12) 
are  primarily  driven  by  nonvoting  presidents  (Model  (14)):  a  1  pp  increase  in  inflation 
increases the likelihood of a hawkish speech by 5.6 pp, whereas a one unit hike in the Leading 
Indexes  raises  this  probability  by  7.3  pp  (national)  and  14.7  pp  (regional).  The  current 
monetary policy direction exerts a marginal effect of 9.5 pp. In contrast, voting presidents 
react only to inflation and the national Leading Index, with an increase in the likelihood of a 
hawkish speech by 3.8 pp and 11.7 pp, respectively. The regional Leading Index and the trend 
variable are statistically insignificant. Governors react only to the national Leading Index; 
their likelihood of making a hawkish speech goes up by 14.7 pp.
21 
Thus, in their speeches, nonvoting presidents pay more attention to regional economic 
developments than do voting presidents. Furthermore, their talk is more in line with the 
current monetary policy trend. Voting presidents and  governors are more concerned with 
national economic conditions and seemingly less backward-looking in their wording. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of U.S. monetary policy stance as expressed in 
speeches  by  FOMC  members  over  the  period  January  1998–September  2009. 
Econometrically, we use a probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables 
to explain speeches. Our analysis provides answers to four research questions. 
First,  do  Fed  presidents  use  national  and/or  regional  economic  information  when 
expressing a tightening (easing) inclination in their speeches? Presidents follow a modified 
Taylor rule when phrasing their speeches. If there is a rise in inflation, they tend to choose 
more hawkish words. An increase in the Leading Index makes it significantly more likely that 
the rhetoric will indicate a tightening of monetary policy. The regional Leading Index is at 
least as important in influencing speeches as the national Leading Index in a model employing 
both variables. This  result contradicts Chappell et al. (2008), who find, in the context of 
disagreement during interest rate discussions, that national developments outweigh regional 
                                                 
21 Note that the national Leading Index contains information about the yield curve spread, which is often used as 
proxy for inflation expectations. 17 
ones.  However,  as  argued  above,  speeches  are  the  least  “costly”  channel  of  expressing 
(regional) concern, which might explain the importance of regional information in the content 
of presidents’ speeches. 
Second, do presidents adjust the contents of their speeches depending on whether they 
speak  inside  or  outside  their  home  district  or  under  different  chairmen  (Greenspan  vs. 
Bernanke)? In line with our expectations, presidents put relatively more weight on regional 
information  when  speaking  in  their  home  districts.  Speeches  delivered  outside  the  home 
district are affected only by national data. Under Alan Greenspan’s tenure as chairman, the 
content of presidents’ speeches is based on national macroeconomic data, whereas under Ben 
Bernanke’s  tenure,  regional  economic  information  dominates.  Thus,  we  confirm  the 
impression that under Greenspan, Fed presidents tend to “speak with one voice,” whereas 
Bernanke allows more diversity in the discussion of U.S. monetary policy. 
Third,  do  presidents’  speeches  react  to  different  phases  of  the  business  cycle 
(contractions vs. expansions) or the recent financial crisis? In times of contraction and during 
the financial crisis, presidents craft their speeches to reflect economic developments in their 
home districts, possibly in an effort to address concerns of the local audience. Moreover, in 
the August 2007–September 2009 subsample, inflation plays a subordinate role in the content 
of Fed communications. 
Fourth, are there significant differences in the content of speeches made by voting 
presidents, nonvoting presidents, and BOG members? In their speeches, nonvoting presidents 
pay more attention to regional economic development than do voting presidents. This group 
of presidents has to rely on instruments other than voting to express views and exert influence 
on policy.  Furthermore, nonvoting presidents’ speeches  are more in  line with  the current 
monetary policy trend than are those of either voting presidents or governors. Speeches by 
voting presidents and governors are influenced by national data and seemingly less backward-
looking in the wording. 
Our results have some interesting political economy implications. In general, speeches 
are an important part of the Fed’s interest rate decision-making process, as they allow all 
FOMC members to express disagreement without having to dissent in  the actual vote on 
monetary policy. We find regional information to be particularly important for speeches (i) 
delivered inside the home district, (ii) during Ben Bernanke’s tenure as Chairman, (iii) during 
contractions of the economy, (iv) during the financial crisis, and (v) by nonvoting presidents. 
Presidents  seem  to  adjust  the  gist  of  their  speeches—which  significantly  affect 
financial market expectations (see, e.g., Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Hayo et al., 2008) and 18 
help predict target rate decisions (Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2010)—to the intended audience. If a 
speech is delivered inside their home district, they put more emphasis on regional information 
than they do in speeches made outside the home district. Thus, a speech made outside the 
home district could be a better indication of a president’s actual voting behavior. Furthermore, 
during economic contractions and the financial crisis, presidents primarily address specific 
concerns in their home districts. The results for nonvoting presidents are very interesting, too: 
these presidents cannot directly influence policy decisions and thus express their sensitivity to 
local  developments  through  speeches.  Their  focus  on  regional  information  is  a  way  of 
showing their interest in the conditions prevalent in their home districts. Not incidentally, this 
focus may also help their chances of reelection, as presidents are selected by the district board 
of directors, members of which represent banking, industrial, and other interests in the home 
region. In contrast, voting presidents are relatively more concerned about national economic 
developments. Thus, they adjust their wording during their voting tenure and their speeches 
are similar to those given by governors. This behavioral change might be caused by increasing 
nation-wide  media  attention  during  their  voting  tenure,  triggering  a  higher  sensitivity  to 
national developments. 
Our paper also has some implications for the European System of Central Banks. Its 
decision-making body, the Governing Council, is dominated by the 17 national central bank 
presidents (in contrast to six members of the Executive Board in Frankfurt). Our finding that 
regional information has a substantial influence on the phrasing of central bank speeches by 
regional  representatives  may  be  even  more  true  in  the  Euro  area,  which  is  much  more 
heterogeneous than the United States. On the one hand, speeches may allow national central 
bank presidents to speak to, and on behalf of, their local audience in their respective home 
countries without having to dissent from actual decisions. On the other hand, since the ECB 
does  not  publish  its  voting records, speeches  by  national  central  bank  presidents  and the 
Executive Board members could be used as a proxy to measure potential disagreement due to 
regional factors in the Euro area, which would be an interesting topic for future research. 
Preliminary evidence by Hayo and Méon (2011), based on simulated counterfactual interest 
rate paths using national Taylor rules, suggests that decision making in the ECB’s Governing 
Council reflects a bargaining process by nationally-oriented central bankers. However, their 
analysis rests on a number of restrictive assumptions that raise concern about the robustness 
of their finding. Thus, studying determinants of speeches by ECB representatives could shed 
more light on this important issue from a different angle.    19 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Frequency of Speeches 
   Tightening  Easing  Total 
Voting Presidents  139  55  194 
Nonvoting Presidents  186  81  267 
Presidents (Total)  325  136  461 
Governors  109  42  151 
 
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Variables 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Minimum  Maximum  Corr. 
CPI Inflation 
National  2.4950  1.29  –0.69  –1.89  5.52  ––– 
             
Leading Index 
National  0.7977  1.25  –1.51  –3.58  2.36  ––– 
Atlanta  –0.3191  0.62  –0.71  –2.00  0.96  0.25 
Boston  –0.0113  0.53  0.06  –1.09  1.24  –0.05 
Chicago  –0.6049  0.68  –0.14  –2.13  0.75  0.18 
Cleveland  –0.4557  0.54  0.16  –1.73  1.05  –0.01 
Dallas  0.1359  0.70  0.20  –1.38  1.91  –0.02 
Kansas City  –0.1229  0.58  –0.42  –1.80  1.22  0.17 
Minneapolis  –0.2081  0.55  –0.20  –1.57  1.26  –0.48 
New York  –0.0289  0.63  0.26  –1.59  1.92  –0.48 
Philadelphia  –0.1757  0.42  0.01  –1.38  0.81  –0.18 
Richmond  –0.1443  0.58  –0.20  –1.43  1.15  0.27 
San Francisco  0.0969  0.52  –0.25  –1.07  1.25  0.41 
St. Louis  –0.4265  0.42  –0.08  –1.57  0.81  0.02 
Notes: Std. Dev. = Standard deviation; Corr. = Correlation with the respective national variable. 
 